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Abstract 
Amicable dispute settlement methods play a major role in the resolution of civil and 
commercial disputes. These mechanisms present advantages to the parties as 
compared to arbitration and litigation.  The Civil Code of 1960 contains provisions 
on Conciliation and Compromise, which set out the minimum legal framework for 
practical use by disputing parties in civil and commercial matters. Conciliation and 
compromise are in the main regulated under Arts. 3318-3324 and 3307-3317 
respectively. The Civil Procedure Code of 1965 also consists of several provisions 
on compromise (Arts. 274-277). Generally, disputes are legally and conveniently 
amenable and better resolved through these amicable dispute settlement methods. 
However, whether they are put in use entirely depends on the free will of the 
disputing parties‟. They can only be resorted to whenever the disputing parties 
commit themselves to use them in their contractual agreements. For certain other 
disputes, these amicable dispute settlement mechanisms are compulsory; in such 
cases, policy rationale dictates that disputes of such nature should be swiftly 
resolved through amicable dispute settlement methods. Some other disputes are, 
however, vested exclusively in the courts. This article distinguishes arbitration from 
conciliation. It is discussed whether conciliation differs from mediation. Attempt 
has also been made to shed light on the nature and application of concilio-
arbitration in Ethiopia. The legal framework underpinning negotiation, conciliation, 
and compromise is expounded. Furthermore, the legal lacunae in relation to 
conciliation is addressed.  
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Introduction 
Alternative dispute settlement mechanisms play a significant role in the 
resolution of civil and commercial disputes in Ethiopia. Direct negotiation and 
conciliation do have no less importance than arbitration. While arbitration has 
(of late) attracted the attention of legal scholars and practitioners, the paucity of 
literature in relation to the amicable dispute resolution mechanisms shows that 
little, if any, attention has been devoted. That notwithstanding, there is a steady 
increase in the number of decided cases in connection with such amicable 
dispute settlement mechanisms by the Cassation Division of the Federal 
Supreme Court. In order for courts to ground their judgments on sound 
theoretical and conceptual underpinnings, therefore, there is the need for 
concerted efforts to enhance the conceptual and legal expositions in this area. 
The first section of this article clarifies the basic conceptual and legal 
foundations of negotiation, mediation or conciliation in Ethiopia, and it sets out 
the conceptual and legal grounds for distinguishing arbitration from conciliation 
or mediation. In Section 2, the nature and conceptual underpinnings of amicable 
dispute settlement mechanisms and their distinguishing features are highlighted. 
Furthermore, the role of the legislature, courts and practicing lawyers 
(advocates) in properly and carefully paying attention to the overall trade-offs 
between settlement of disputes and litigation is discussed. The legal framework 
for conciliation, as it stands today, and the legal lacunae thereof are enunciated 
in Section 3. Finally, the salient peculiarities, enforcement and the legal 
framework on compromise (that is to say, the outcome of direct negotiation, 
mediation or conciliation) are discussed in Section 4 based on the relevant legal 
provisions and authoritative cases.  
1. Arbitration and Amicable Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
Arbitration exhibits differing attributes from the other non-adversarial dispute 
settlement methods; it is actually more akin to litigation than the amicable 
dispute resolution mechanisms. Arbitration is not thus the subject of this article. 
However, a brief discussion is ventured below to highlight the salient 
dissimilarities between arbitration and the amicable dispute settlement 
mechanisms in general and conciliation or mediation in particular. In Mukemil 
Mohammed v Miftah Kedir,1 the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme 
Court identified four alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, viz., 
negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. The Court, then, proceeded 
to determine whether the dispute settlement method that the disputing parties 
employed to resolve their disputes was conciliation or arbitration.  
                                           
1
 Cassation Case No. 38794 [2001EC] Fed. Sup. Ct. Rep., Vol. 9, p.182. 
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It should be noted that „unlike an arbitrator, a conciliator is not empowered to 
make a binding decision and this fact forms the main distinction between 
arbitration and conciliation‟.2 Notwithstanding the aforesaid statement, the 
boundary line between arbitration and conciliation is not clearly delineated. 
According to René David,3 „[i]t is difficult to draw a clear distinction between 
arbitration and conciliation. Confusion may arise here from the fact that 
arbitrators often receive powers to decide according to equity or may be directed 
to apply law rules or legal principles other than the rules or principles which a 
judge would have to apply‟.4 He further noted that „arbitrators may be, in many 
cases, inclined to work out a decision which will be acceptable to all parties 
concerned‟.5 
That notwithstanding, René David noted that „there exists a fundamental 
difference between arbitration and conciliation. The solution proposed by the 
conciliator or mediator must be accepted by the [disputing parties] concerned, 
and it becomes binding only when they have adhered to it; the decision of the 
arbitrator, on the contrary, is binding on interested parties independently of any 
acceptance…‟.6 
In Mukemil Mohammed v Miftah Kedir, the Court decided that the dispute 
settlement process that the parties employed was arbitration. In distinguishing 
arbitration from conciliation, the Court took cognizance of three facts that the 
Court found relevant for its decision:7 firstly, the parties had entrusted the 
„arbitrators‟ with the decision-making power to which the parties vouched to 
accept as binding; secondly, pursuant to the arbitration clause that the parties 
entered into, the parties had agreed that the process would be governed under 
Arts. 3325-3346 of the Civil Code; and, finally, that arbitration proceedings 
would not be amenable to the strict application of civil procedure rules. The 
Court, thus, decided to recognize the process as arbitration. However, all the 
„arbitrators/ conciliator‟8 had given their testimony that they all had believed to 
have been appointed to conciliate between the parties and accordingly acted as 
conciliators and not as arbitrators.  
                                           
2
 Nael G. Bunni (2005), FIDIC Forms of Contract, 3
rd
 ed., Blackwell Publishing, p.445. 
3
 René David (1985), Arbitration in International Trade, Kluwer Law International, p.7. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Mukemil Mohammed v MiftahKedir, supra note 1, at 175. 
8
 In this case, the Cassation Division reversed the decisions of the Federal First Instance 
Court and High Court; both had decided that the dispute settlement process employed by 
the parties was conciliation and not arbitration. 
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In what appeared to be an identical case, the High Court of Botswana, in St. 
Joseph’s College v Dawson & Fraser (Pty) Ltd and Others,9 noted that, in order 
to „… ascertain the true legal nature of what had in reality occurred between the 
parties, one had to look deeper into the details of the agreement, the 
characteristics of the process and its expected outcome‟. The Court, then, 
concluded that „[t]he determining factor in the matter was that the parties agreed 
to be bound by the process. It became an irrevocable outcome situation in so far 
as neither disputant could revoke the opinion. The process was therefore clearly 
not mediation‟.10 It should be noted, however, that parties‟ agreement to have a 
„final and binding decision‟ handed down by a third-party neutral may exclude 
the mediation or conciliation process; that does not, however, necessarily make 
it an arbitration.  
The distinguishing feature for arbitration is cogently presented by Duncan 
Wallace as follows:11 
If […] a person is appointed with the intention that he should hear the parties 
and their evidence and decide in a judicial manner, then, he is an arbitrator, 
though a mere absence of a hearing, provided it does not result in any 
unfairness to the parties, will not necessarily invalidate an award … the 
intention in such cases is that there should be a judicial inquiry worked out in 
a judicial manner.[Emphasis supplied]. 
In Mukemil Mohammed v Miftah Kedir, the respondent argued that the 
process should not be deemed to be arbitration as it was too informal. In 
countering this argument, the Cassation Division stated that the arbitrators are 
not bound to comply with the stringent procedural requirements as courts do. 
                                           
9
 [2005] 2 BLR 418 (HC) (Per Justice Marumo). 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 I.N. Duncan Wallace (1970), Hudson‟s Building and Engineering Contracts, 10th ed., 
Sweet and Maxwell, p.826 (In distinguishing arbitration from other decisional or 
judgmental processes (such as expert determination, valuers, assessors, adjudicators, etc, 
it is stated herein thus: 
       If a person is appointed, owing to his skill and knowledge of the particular subject, to 
decide any questions, whether of fact or of value, by the use of his skill and knowledge 
and without taking any evidence or hearing the parties, he is not, prima facie, an 
arbitrator … if a man is, on account of his skill in such matters, appointed to make 
valuations, in such manner that in making it he may, in accordance with the 
appointment, decide solely by the use of his eyes, his knowledge, and his skill, he is not 
acting judicially: he is using the skill of a valuer, not of a judge … they have to 
determine the matter by using solely their own eyes, knowledge and skill.) 
    In this regard, see, for instance, the role of the so-called arbitrator under Art.2271 of the 
Civil Code (wherein it is stated thus: “(1) The price may be referred to the arbitration of a 
third party. (2) There shall be no sale where such third party refuses or is unable to make 
an estimate.” 
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However, arbitration like any judicial or quasi-judicial function, presupposes the 
maintenance of the minimum procedural and substantive requirements in the 
process of disposition of justice. 
Conciliation is, thus, less formal than arbitration as it is aimed to „avoid the 
risk of losing costly binding dispute processes and assists the parties in 
developing creative solutions‟.12 Furthermore, it is a „process that can preserve 
commercial relationships and, in some cases, even resurrect relationships‟.13 As 
Jones noted:14 
The non-binding processes allow parties to share the risk of losing, and to 
devise outcomes different to those produced by a binding process. The result 
will inevitably be a compromise, but the important point is that, because the 
process is voluntary and non-binding, neither party will lose. The result is a 
commercially workable solution, although it may not be a „win-win‟ 
solution. Usually neither party will be pleased with the outcome as they 
would be if they had „won‟.  
In contradistinction to arbitration and litigation, therefore, the amicable 
dispute settlement mechanisms (i.e., direct negotiation, conciliation or 
mediation) ensure parties‟ control and satisfaction over the outcome.  
2. Amicable Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: Choosing the 
Appropriate Method  
2.1 Direct negotiation 
Nael Bunni stated that „direct negotiation between parties in dispute without the 
intervention of a third party is perhaps the most readily available method of 
dispute resolution and the most effective‟.15 Indeed, it is the most informal, 
flexible and least regulated by law. Not only must this be the most predominant 
but also the most cost-effective, amicable, efficient and all-inclusive dispute 
settlement method. Negotiation, as Asouzu stated, is: “…a process leading to 
joint decision-making by the disputing parties themselves. It is an interactive 
                                           
12
 Doug Jones (2005), „Various Non-binding (ADR) Processes‟, in New Horizons in 
International Commercial Arbitration and Beyond, in (ed.), Albert Jan van den Berg, 
ICCA, Kluwer Law International, p.371.  
13
 Id., at 370. 
14
 Id., at 367. 
15
 Bunni (2005), supra note 2, p. 441. 
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process of information exchange and learning, leading ultimately to a decision 
accepted to both disputing parties”.16 
Negotiation is characterized by the absence of a third party neutral in 
facilitating the interactive communications between the parties. Negotiation is, 
thus, a process „leading to joint decision-making by the disputing parties 
themselves‟.17 Most commercial disputes are usually resolved at their early 
stages through such bilateral interactions, discussion, and mutual concessions 
between the disputing parties.  
It is, thus, common for legislatures and contracting parties to firmly place 
negotiation as the first option for the settlement of disputes. It has, for instance, 
mustered up salience in the government procurement contracts to the extent that 
„direct negotiation‟ between a contractor/supplier/service-provider, on the one 
hand, and the procuring entity, on the other, has become the only recourse for 
the settlement of disputes prior to resort to courts.18 Furthermore, Art. 76(1) of 
the Mining Proclamation No. 678/201019 provides that „[a]ny dispute, 
controversy or claim between the Licensing Authority and a licensee [mining 
concession company] arising out of or relating to an agreement for 
reconnaissance, exploration, retention, or mining or the interpretation, breach or 
termination thereof shall, to the extent possible, be resolved through 
negotiation.‟ Similarly, Art. 25(1) of the Petroleum Operations Proclamation 
No. 295/198620 provides for the application of negotiation to resolve disputes 
prior to arbitration. 
2.2 Conciliation and mediation 
In mediation or conciliation, the process of resolving disputes is facilitated by a 
third party neutral. As will be discussed below, the role of the third party neutral 
is quintessential in bringing the parties together to discuss their disputes and 
arrange for settlement between them.  
Whether conciliation and mediation are different methods of dispute 
settlement has, however, been an issue of contention. It is stressed, for instance, 
by Jones21 that, whilst they are conceptually similar, „the two processes are, 
                                           
16
 Amazu A. Asouzu (2001), International Commercial Arbitration and African States: 
Practices, Participation and Institutional Development: Cambridge University Press, p. 
18.  
17
 Id., at 18. 
18
 See Art.26 General Conditions of Contract (GCC) of the Standard Bidding Documents 
(SBD) for supplies, construction and services issued by the Federal Public Procurement 
and Property Administration Agency (FPPPAA) in 2011, available at : 
     http://www.ppa.gov.et.> (Last visited on 16August 2019). 
19
 Fed. Neg. Gaz. Year 16, No.45, 2010. 
20
 Neg. Gaz., Year 45, No.6, 1986. 
21
 Jones, supra note 12, p. 368. 
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distinguished by the degree of involvement of the neutral third party‟.22 He 
argues that: 
A mediator not only chairs the meetings of the parties, as does a conciliator, 
but also takes an active role in the discussions and negotiations. As such, a 
mediator has a greater involvement in the substantive issues of the dispute 
than does a conciliator, sometimes even producing a report. 
Others hold a differing view. Nael Bunni,23 for instance, is of the view that 
the mediator is the passive intervener and the conciliator is the active one. He 
states that conciliation is where: 
… the neutral party takes a more active role probing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the parties‟ case, making suggestions, giving advice, finding 
persuasive arguments for and against each of the parties‟ positions, and 
creating new ideas which might induce them to settle their dispute… [if] the 
parties fail to reach agreement, the neutral party himself is then required to 
draw up and propose a solution which represents what, in his view, is a fair 
and reasonable compromise of the dispute.  
According to Nael Bunni, mediation is where the mediator „… simply 
performs the task of persuading the parties in dispute to change their respective 
positions in the hope of reaching a point where those positions coincide, a form 
of shuttle diplomacy without actively initiating any ideas as to how the dispute 
might be settled‟.24 Nevertheless, he admits that there is no universal agreement 
in such characterization. 
Asouzu also admits25 that it is common to treat the two methods as different. 
However, there is a significant confusion amongst writers as to what exactly 
distinguishes mediation from conciliation.26 As alluded to above, Nael Bunni27 
argues, for instance, that conciliation is a more formal process than mediation. 
He further states that conciliation has an added advantage because „… should no 
amicable solution be reached, the conciliator has a duty to attempt to persuade 
the differing parties to accept his own solution to the dispute‟.28 
                                           
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Bunni, supra note 2, pp. 426-8. 
24
 Id., p.425-6. 
25
 Asouzu, supra note 16, p.19. 
26
 Ibid, at 19 (stating that the description of the functions of a mediator by one writer is taken 
for by another to be that of the conciliator and vice versa). 
27
 Nael G. Bunni (1997), The FIDIC Form of Contract: The Fourth Edition of the Red Book, 
2
nd
 ed., Blackwell Science Ltd., p.428. 
28
 Ibid;  See also Margaret Moses (2008), The Principles and Practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration, CUP, p.14 (wherein it is stated that „[a] conciliator listens to the 
two parties, hears their different positions, and then sets forth a proposed settlement 
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Experts admit that there is no uniform international conceptualization of the 
two methods. Bunni epitomizes this distinction as he mentions that the functions 
attributed to mediation in the American Arbitration Association (AAA) is not 
in-keeping with the process of conciliation in the Continental Europe.29 
It is true that negotiation, conciliation or mediation are outside court dispute 
settlement methods in which an amicable settlement of dispute is sought through 
mutual concessions. Such mutual concessions are made to achieve a settlement 
acceptable to both parties in which there is no winner or loser. This process of 
„giving and taking‟ ensures that parties are involved in jointly solving the 
problem for mutual gain rather than winning their positions. These processes are 
much opted, inter alia, for the „win/win‟ situation rather than the „winner-takes-
it-all‟ outcome in arbitration and litigation. Unlike direct negotiation, both 
mediation and conciliation are characterized by the involvement of a neutral 
third party-mediator/conciliator- who helps in facilitating the negotiation 
process between the disputing parties.  
Asouzu, concurring with Jones, recognizes that the mediator is the active 
third party intervener. He states that conciliation is “… a less formal procedure 
than mediation or one in which the neutral third party is less active…will not 
generally make a recommendation as to the terms but a mediator will go further 
and formulate his or her own recommendation on settlement terms”.30 
Asouzu is, however, of the opinion that the distinction is pedantic; the 
passive or active nature of the conciliator or mediator simply is left to the 
discretion of the said neutral party and depends on whether or not the solution is 
forthcoming easily from the parties. Asouzu concludes that „the making of 
recommendations, which is said to be a feature of active participation by the 
mediator, is not unique to mediation‟.31 He rather commented that „whether or 
not a third party intervener will make a recommendation depends on the 
circumstances and is a question of degree and form‟. He further observed that 
the third party intervener would „skillfully‟ make recommendations only if the 
likelihood of acceptance is great‟.32 
It should also be noted that, in many legal systems, the terms „mediation‟ and 
„conciliation‟ are rather used interchangeably. In other countries, they are used 
                                                                                                            
agreement, representing what she believes to be a fair compromise of the dispute. If the 
proposal does not resolve the dispute, the conciliator may offer another proposal‟. She is 
of the opinion that mediators can only make a specific proposal at the parties‟ request). 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Asouzu, supra note 16, pp. 19-20. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid. 
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in such a way that only one of the words is used to include the meaning of the 
other word („mediation‟ includes „conciliation‟ in particular).33 
In Ethiopia, the distinction is not yet clear. This obscurity is compounded by 
the paucity of literature in this respect. What is clear is that legislative 
enactments have remained loyal to the use of the term „conciliation‟.34 In this 
regard, one can safely conclude that it is legally allowable for the conciliator or 
mediator to propose terms of settlement agreement whenever it is necessary and 
as the surrounding circumstances warrant doing so.35 At any rate, from the 
reading of the laws, one cannot extrapolate the conclusion that the conciliator is 
legally inhibited from making recommendations or propose settlement 
agreements.36 As Blackaby and Partasides noted:37 
The terms „mediation‟ and „conciliation‟ are often used as if they are 
interchangeable; and there is no general agreement as to how to define them. 
Historically, conciliator was seen as someone who went a step further than 
the mediator, so to speak, in that the conciliator would draw up and propose 
the terms of an agreement that he or she considered represented a fair 
settlement. In practice, the two terms seem to have merged. 
In carrying out such an active role, however, it is quite important to realize 
that the conciliator should be cautious lest he/she should be cajoled into 
assuming the position of a decision-maker. It is not uncommon for the parties to 
hasten themselves to, advertently or inadvertently, confer that power upon the 
conciliator during the negotiation process.38 
                                           
33
 See also Kazuo Takayanagi (2005), Japan in (ed.), Robert Knutson, FIDIC: An Analysis 
of International Construction Contracts, Kluwer Law International, p. 220. 
34
 It is seldom, if at all, that the term „mediation‟ is used in legislative enactments in 
Ethiopia. It is, thus, yet to be seen how the concepts will evolve in the future. In fact, 
recently a draft conciliation law under the auspices of the (now defunct) Ethiopian 
Arbitration and Conciliation Center (EACC) had been captioned „Draft Mediation Law‟.  
35
 Art. 3320 of the Civil Code; see also the definition of „conciliation‟ in Art. 136(1) of the 
Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003, Fed. Neg. Gaz., Year 10, No. 12, 2004 (wherein it is 
defined thus: “… the activity [conducted] by a private person or persons appointed by the 
Ministry at the joint request of the parties for the purpose of bringing the parties together 
and seeking to arrange between them voluntary settlement of a labour dispute which their 
own efforts alone do not produce.”); see also Art.3320 (1) of the Civil Code (wherein it is 
stated thus: „Before expressing his findings, the conciliator shall give the parties an 
opportunity of fully stating their views.‟ [Italics supplied]. 
36
  In this article, therefore, unless otherwise indicated, the terms „mediation‟ and 
„conciliation‟ are used interchangeably. 
37
 Nigel Blackaby et al (2009), Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 5
th
 ed., 
OUP, p.46. 
38
 It is in fact the present author‟s experience that parties more often than not would, for 
instance, intimate to the conciliator that they have agreed on the salient points and what 
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2.2.1  Understanding the role of conciliation in the amicable dispute 
settlement system 
In Ethiopia, the traditional or customary rules of dispute settlement have been 
playing an important role in the settlement of all sorts of disputes relating to 
civil and commercial transactions.39 The Civil Code of 196040 also catered for 
the basic legal framework according to which these ADR methods and 
Arbitration were meant to operate. Thus, direct negotiation, conciliation,41 
concilio-arbitration,42 and Arbitration43 have been legally recognized in 
Ethiopia.44 In Mukemil Mohammed v Miftah Kedir, the Cassation Division of 
the Federal Supreme Court, as stated earlier in Section 1, recognized that there 
are generally four alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (viz. negotiation, 
conciliation, mediation, and arbitration).45 Due regard has also been given to the 
enforcement of the outcomes of amicable dispute resolution methods (i.e., 
negotiation and conciliation) by incorporating set of provisions on compromise 
(compromise agreement or negotiated settlement).46 
It is believed that these Civil Codal provisions have given alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms and arbitration the necessary legal framework. In other 
                                                                                                            
are left are minor points upon which the conciliator can freely decide or that either or both 
are ready to accept whatever the conciliator decides as appropriate and other equivalent 
expressions to which the conciliator should not succumb. 
39
 TilahunTeshome (2007), „The Legal Regime Governing Arbitration in Ethiopia: A 
Synopsis‟, Ethiopian Bar Review, Vol.1, No.2, p.117-118 (where it is stated that 
shimglina was and still is “… the dominant mode of alternative dispute resolution, 
particularly in the rural areas where access to law enforcement organs is very much 
limited.) For a critical analyses of the distinctions between the traditional „shimglina‟ and 
the modern ADR methods and Arbitration, see Fekadu Petros, „Underlying Distinctions 
Between ADR, Shimglina and Arbitration: A Critical Analysis‟, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 
3, No.1, pp. 105-133. 
40
 Civil Code of the Empire of Ethiopia Proclamation No.165/1960, Negarit Gazetta, 
Gazette Extraordinary, Year 19, No.2, May 5, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as „Civil 
Code‟). 
41
 Id., Arts.3318-3324. 
42
 Id., Arts. 676 cum 731-737 on family arbitrators. 
43
 Id., Arts. 3325-3346. 
44
 In the public international law sphere, Ethiopian lawyers may also be faced with the 
dispute resolution methods, such as: good offices, mediation, international commissions 
of Inquiry and state-to-state arbitration as enunciated under the Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes. See Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes (1899) Ratification Proclamation No.348/2003, Fed. Neg. Gaz, 
Year 9, No.69, 2003. Negotiations, conciliations and arbitrations may play significant role 
in resolving investors‟ claims, under the Ethiopian multilateral and bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs), in investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) in the future.  
45
 Mukemil Mohammed v Miftah Kedir, supra note 1, p. 174. 
46
 Arts. 3307-3317 of Civil Code. 
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words, these provisions were necessary to accord the alternative dispute 
resolution methods and arbitration the substantive and procedural guarantees to 
the parties wishing to employ them.  In the absence of such provisions, ADR 
and arbitration might have existed in one form or another as customary dispute 
resolution (CDR) methods. Moreover, the Civil Code provisions provide 
disputing parties the minimum principles of fairness in their proceedings for 
granting them deference by courts once they are employed in the resolution of 
commercial and civil disputes.  
Disputing parties find these amicable dispute settlement mechanisms more 
convenient vis-à-vis the adversarial mechanisms, i.e., arbitration and litigation. 
No doubt, the advantages thereof significantly outweigh any disadvantage that is 
advanced against them. Suffice it to mention here the most touted advantages 
that are attributed to these amicable settlement methods, namely: (i) satisfaction 
(win-win outcome vis-à-vis win/lose), (ii) continued relationship, or even 
reviving commercial relationships; (iii) easing the strict applicability of the law 
(instead, peaceful, harmonious and reconciliatory solution); (iv) control of 
outcome and procedural flexibility by the parties, (v) confidentiality, (vi) less 
costlier, speedier settlement of disputes, use of expertise, and (vii) ease of 
enforceability of outcomes.  
This does not, however, mean that these methods are entirely immune from 
defects. Like any tool, it can be properly used or be abused. These mechanisms 
may, for instance, be deployed as a dilatory tactic (for buying time to plead 
period of prescription, for piecing up evidence together, for tantalizing a weaker 
disputant, etc), for harassing weaker parties (non-repeat party), etc.47 
2.2.2 The role of courts and advocates in advancing Amicable Dispute 
Resolution  
Courts play a significant role in the success of conciliation processes. This is 
done, firstly, by encouraging, or even persuading (in cases of court-referred or 
court-annexed ADR) disputing parties to conciliation at any stage of the 
proceedings.48 There is no reason for a court to burden itself with backlogs when 
and if such cases can be conveniently settled amicably by the parties 
themselves.49 Apparently, states have significant interest in not burdening their 
                                           
47
 Karl Mackie et al. (1995), Commercial Dispute Resolution: An ADR Practice Guide, 
(London: Butterworths), p. 329. 
48
 Art. 274 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1965.  
49
 David Fosket opined thus: “No authority is needed to support the proposition that the 
courts welcome and encourage compromise. The reasons are manifest. In some instances, 
the approval of the court is necessary for a compromise to be effective. Generally 
speaking, however, this is necessary and the court is not concerned with the terms of the 
compromise. That is a matter for the parties. Since they created the dispute, they can 
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courts with litigation that might be better conducted in another convenient 
forum in a just manner. Secondly, the court would compel parties to participate 
in ADR and Arbitration proceedings whenever the law imposes compulsory 
ADR and Arbitration proceedings50 for the settlement of particular disputes or 
whenever there is contractual ADR clause or arbitral clause agreed upon by the 
parties. Finally, courts would intervene in appointing a conciliator; interim 
measures of protection (IMP); subpoenaing witnesses; compelling evidences, 
enforcing compromises („compromise settlements‟), etc… 
The role of advocates in the conciliation process is no less significant. At 
several occasions (where the present author has participated in trainings), the 
comment that quickly surfaced into the floor is that advocates are the primary 
culprits for sowing the seed of intransigence during parties‟ negotiations. The 
veracity (exactitude) or otherwise of this innuendos notwithstanding, advocates 
are duty-bound to comply with the professional code of conduct embodied in 
Regulations No.57/1999. Accordingly, the judges, at the court of law, should be 
on guard to see to it that any advocate remains loyal to the professional code of 
conduct. In this regard, at least the following two obligations must serve as a 
signpost: the duty to advise the client at the beginning, and the duty to advise the 
client at any stage of the court proceedings. In this regard, Art. 26 of the 
Regulation No.57/99 provides:51 “[w]hen an advocate finds that the desired 
result can be obtained if his client‟s case can be resolved by settlement rather 
than in court, he may encourage the consideration of the case by settlement.” 
The duty to advise one‟s client on possible outcomes and the merits and 
demerits of ADR, arbitration and litigation proceedings can also be extrapolated 
from the reading under Art. 7(1) of the Regulation which requires the advocate 
to give his client „explanation based on the law as to the possible result or 
alternative results of the matter …‟. [Emphasis supplied]. This is particularly so 
when one realizes that the right of the client and the duty of the advocate, as 
enunciated under the second limb of Art. 7(2), are complementary: that is to say, 
the advocate „shall, in particular, respect the decision made by the client to solve 
the matter by settlement‟, would be rendered otiose short of such an obligation 
on the part of the advocates.52   
                                                                                                            
dispose of it as they please.” David Foskett (1980), The Law and Practice of Compromise, 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell), p.113.  
50
 For instance, Arts. 46-52 of the Federal Cooperative Societies Proclamation No. 
147/1998, Fed. Neg. Gaz. Year 5, No. 27, 1998. 
51
 The Federal Courts Advocates‟ Code of Conduct Regulations No. 57/1999, Fed. Neg. 
Gaz., Year 6, No.1, 1999.  
52
 McIlwrath and Savage noted that disputing parties „will want to make a reasonable 
assessment of the likely outcome of the litigation and the costs of getting alternatives 
along the way‟. They suggest that „conducting an early case assessment (ECA), that is to 
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At any rate, it should be borne in mind that even if the precise obligation is 
not sufficiently defined, there is a legal basis for the courts to hold accountable 
an advocate who conspicuously fails to advise his clients on the possible options 
of ADR processes for cases which could have been conveniently and amicably 
resolved thereby. Secondly, the advocate is also duty-bound to „… follow up his 
client‟s case diligently and take all the necessary measures carefully and timely 
so as to obtain a quick and just decision‟.53 The advocate should, throughout the 
pendency of the case, keep his eyes open for the optimal solution of the case 
wherein ADR proceedings should come into consideration. 
Finally, as the primary objective of formulating any normative rules is 
predicated on maintaining the continuity of the socio-economic, political, and 
cultural interaction unabated, conciliation processes are envisaged to oil the 
wheels of the civil and commercial dispute settlement machinery. Hence, in the 
sphere of the international business transactions, all efforts are geared towards 
unhindered or uninhibited transactions. To this end, the ALI/Unidroit Draft54 
Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure (2001), under Art.21, provides: 
(i) The court, while respecting the parties‟ right to participate in litigation, 
should encourage settlement and reconciliation of the parties when 
reasonably possible. The court should facilitate the parties‟ participation 
in ADR procedure and voluntary settlement at any stage of the 
proceeding; 
(ii) The parties, both before and after commencement of litigation, should 
cooperate in reasonable settlement endeavors. The Court may adjust its 
cost awards to reflect unreasonable failure to cooperate in this respect or 
bad faith participation in such settlement endeavors. 
Whether these principles, as embodied in Transnational Civil Procedure 
Rules, have achieved the status of customary international law is still dubious.  
The principles have, however, been widely espoused by courts and commercial 
arbitral tribunals as a guidepost for allocation of costs when a disputing party 
fails to amicably settle its disputes in bad faith. 
 
                                                                                                            
say, an initial evaluation of the dispute that quantifies the range of probable outcomes and 
the associated costs‟ is appropriate. For more on this, see Michael McIlwrathand John 
Savage (2010),  International Arbitration and Mediation: A Practical Guide, (Kluwer 
Law International BV, The Netherlands), p. 117. 
53
 The Federal Courts Advocates‟ Code of Conduct Regulations No.57/99, supra note 51, 
Art. 8(2)(b). 
54
 The full text of the Draft is on file with the author. See also 
https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/transnational-civil-procedure [Last visited on 16 
August 2019]. 
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2.2.3  Legislative stipulations for optional or imperative use of amicable 
dispute settlement and Arbitration 
There have been instances wherein for some policy reasons, legislatures have 
opted, from time to time, for the application of amicable dispute settlement 
methods or arbitral proceedings in the settlement of certain specific disputes. 
Various legislative enactments have, thus, contained provisions on negotiation, 
conciliation and/or arbitration for use by parties. Such provisions are either 
directory55 or mandatory. In the main, the use of such dispute settlement 
mechanisms is optional for the parties. It is not, however, uncommon to find 
such stipulations envisaged for imperative application in the process of settling 
disputes arising out of or relative to certain specific disputes. 
a)  Concilio-Arbitration 
This process was used under the family law in the Civil Code in Ethiopia. 
Indeed, the process of concilio-arbitration resembles the traditional ‘shimglina’ 
process which combines both the carrot and stick modality towards settling 
disputes.56 Practice aside, the family arbitrators‟ mandate is not to serve only as 
arbitrators; they are entrusted with the mandate to resolve the marital disputes: 
first of all, amicably through conciliation, and, failing that, then through 
arbitration. Articles 676-677 of the Civil Code, thus, stipulated that the 
„arbitrators‟ should attempt to reconcile the disputing spouses and, should they 
fail to reach a settlement agreement, they should proceed to the arbitral process. 
The process combines both conciliation and arbitration and, hence, the name 
„concilio-arbitration‟.57 
Similarly, the Labor Relations Board (LRB) is empowered to assume the role 
of Concilio-Arbitration in the settlement of collective labor disputes in Ethiopia. 
In this respect, Art. 147(1)(b) and 147(2) of the Labor Proclamation No. 
377/200358 stipulate that the LRB (ad hoc or permanent) is enjoined „to 
conciliate the parties and to give orders and decisions‟. This role is also assumed 
by the courts in marital dispute settlement procedures under the Revised Family 
Code (RFC).59 Firstly, Article 82(1) of the RFC provides that the Court which is 
                                           
55
 For instance, Art. 5 of the Transfer of Technology Council of Ministers Regulations 
No.121/1993, Neg. Gaz. Year 52, No.53, 1993 provides that “Parties may agree to settle 
disputes arising in connection with technology transfer agreement by direct negotiation or 
in accordance with rules and procedures of conciliation and arbitration.” 
56
 For more on this, see Fekadu Petros, supra note 39. 
57
 See also Aklilu Wolde Ammanuel (1973), „The Fallacies of Family Arbitration under the 
1960 Ethiopian Civil Code‟, 9 Journal of Ethiopian Law 176, 179 (wherein it is stated that 
reconciliation is part of family arbitration under Art. 676 of the Ethiopian Civil Code. 
58
 Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003, Fed. Neg. Gaz., Year 10, No.12, 2004. 
59
 Revised Family Code Proclamation No. 213/2000, Fed. Neg. Gaz., Extraordinary Issue, 
No. 1, 2000.  
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seized with „Petition for Divorce‟ by either of the spouses has to try to convince 
the parties to withdraw the petition. This should be achieved by reconciling the 
underlying differing interests held by the parties and seeking for a mutually 
agreeable solution. In other words, the court will use conciliation to settle the 
points of disagreements between the spouses. Thus, any court in which petition 
for divorce has been filed must, first of all, proceed to conduct the conciliation 
process between the spouses. This should be effected carefully thought-out 
conciliation steps including speaking to the spouses separately or jointly with a 
view of persuading them to renounce the petition for divorce and settling their 
disputes amicably.  
Such a dispute settlement method, however, has its own inherent defects so 
much so that it has been critiqued as a non-viable method. Indeed, reposing 
conciliation proceeding and decision-making of a case in the same person(s) can 
prove itself a complete fiasco. Not only does it hinder the parties from making 
offers and admissions during the negotiation lest it should boomerang on them, 
but also lures them to be more focused in persuading the conciliator/decision-
maker instead of pursuing a concerted problem-solving approach. The parties 
may also find it difficult to confide in the conciliator/arbitrator for fear that their 
respective potential weaknesses in their cases may be exposed. Furthermore, the 
parties are tempted to closely scrutinize the words and proposals made during 
the proceedings by the conciliator/arbitrator in order to infer a likely result if 
arbitration becomes necessary.  
Indeed, such a dispute settlement mechanism should not be imposed upon the 
disputing parties by law. Resort to such a mechanism by the parties should only 
be had if the parties are fully cognizant of the implications thereof and only with 
their express consent. Otherwise, it may be an unwelcome exercise for a 
conciliator-turned-arbitrator to piece up together evidence and other relevant 
information (such as confidential information, admissions or offers made for 
purposes of reconciliation only, documents presented by either party on „without 
prejudice‟ basis, etc) during the negotiation processes and, thereupon, impose a 
decision. It can be safely said that such method is likely to be an antithesis to the 
entire modus operandi of the negotiation processes. 
b) Conciliation/ Mediation 
Certain disputes are more conveniently settled in one forum than another. The 
policy choice must be mirrored by legislative enactments. In this regard, unless 
expressly prohibited by law or exclusively vested in the courts for litigation, all 
civil and commercial disputes can be legally and conveniently resolved through 
amicable dispute settlement mechanisms, depending upon the choice of the 
parties. For certain group of disputes, however, the need to entice or urge or 
even compel the parties to use a specific modality of dispute settlement is even 
more pressing for some clearly espoused policy rationale. 
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In this regard, conciliation is made compulsory in resolving disputes related 
to cooperative societies which arise in connection to the „organization, 
management, and operations‟ of a society or between societies.60 Secondly, in 
collective labor disputes, conciliation process is mandatory, at first instance, for 
the settlement of disputes arising out of or relating to disputes set out under Art. 
142 of the Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003 in undertakings61 other than the 
essential public service undertakings.62  
This position has been espoused by the Federal Supreme Court‟s Cassation 
Division in Construction Works and Coffee Technology Promotion Enterprise’s 
Trade Union v. Construction Works and Coffee Technology Promotion 
Enterprise.63 The Cassation Division ruled that disputes in connection to „wages 
and other benefits‟ envisaged under Art. 142(1)(a) of the Labour Proclamation 
No. 377/2003 in undertakings other than those essential public services 
undertakings should not be submitted for litigation to courts or LRB (ad hoc or 
permanent). The resolution of such disputes is vested exclusively in conciliators. 
The Cassation Division reasoned that any recourse to courts or the LRB, prior to 
or subsequent to conciliation, would deprive the employees or employers of 
their right to take industrial actions, i.e., strike or lock-out respectively. All other 
collective labour disputes set out under Art. 142(1)(b) through to (h) arising in 
all undertakings (irrespective of the kind of undertakings, i.e., employees in 
essential services or otherwise) are also amenable to conciliation pursuant to 
either Art. 141 cum Art. 158/2 (conciliation through the Ministry or at lower 
administrative echelons) or Art. 143 (through mutually agreed dispute settlement 
clauses).  
Third, under the Revised Family Code, arbitration is compulsory for 
resolving disputes which arise out of or relating to the spouses‟ household 
managerial issues.64 Unlike the marital relationship under the 1960 Civil Code, 
which had accorded the husband the right to head the household, the new family 
codes (including those of the regional states) provide that both the husband and 
wife are jointly the heads of the family. In cases of absence of consensus in the 
decision-making processes, the impasse is overcome by an arbitral proceeding65 
whose arbitral award may be appealed against by either spouse.  
                                           
60
 Art.47-49 of the Federal Cooperative Societies‟ Proclamation No. 147/98, Fed. Neg. Gaz., 
Year 5, No.27, 1998. 
61
 Art.141 of the Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003, supra note 58. 
62
 Ibid. These „essential public services undertakings‟ are enumerated under Art. 136(2) of 
the Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003. 
63
 Cassation Case No. 49152 [2002EC], Fed. Sup. Ct. Rep., Vol.11, pp. 284-287. 
64
Art. 118 of the Revised Family Code, supra note 59. 
65
 Ibid. 
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Fourth, direct negotiation and arbitration are compulsory for resolving 
disputes arising from or in connection with petroleum concession contracts in 
Ethiopia.66 Fifth, direct negotiation and arbitration are compulsory for resolving 
disputes arising from mining concession contracts in Ethiopia.67 Finally, it is 
stipulated that attempt should, at first instance, be made by the complainants and 
the head of the procuring entity to amicably resolve bidders‟ and/or candidates‟ 
complaints relating to the decisions by procuring entities on the public 
procurement of public works contracts, public supply contracts, and services 
(including consultancy service contracts) and asset disposal procedures.68  
It should also be noted that, in all the Standard Conditions of Contract 
(SCC)69 prescribed to all the federal procuring entities in 2011 by the Federal 
Public Procurement and Property Administration Agency (FPPPAA), it is 
provided that any disagreement, controversy or dispute between the procuring 
entity and the contractor/supplier/service-provider should be resolved through 
„direct informal negotiation‟. For instance, in construction contracts, every effort 
should be made by the consulting engineer and the contractor‟s contract 
manager to resolve the issues amicably; and if this fails, the parties have to 
appoint more senior representatives in order to resolve the dispute. It is only 
thereafter that either party can require that the dispute be referred to courts or 
arbitration. In this case, direct negotiation plays a significant role both in the 
tendering processes and contract performances of public procurement and 
disposal of assets. 
 
 
 
 
                                           
66
 Art. 25 of the Petroleum Operations Proclamation No. 295/1986,  Neg. Gaz., Year 45, No. 
6, 1986. See also the 1994 Model Production Sharing Agreement for the Exploration and 
Production of Petroleum with the Government of Ethiopia, Art.16.2. 
67
 Art. 76 of the Mining Operations Proclamation No. 678/2010, Fed. Neg. Gaz., Year 16, 
No.45, 2010. 
68
 See Art.73 of the Ethiopian Federal Government procurement and Property 
Administration Proclamation No. 649/2009, Fed. Neg. Gaz., Year 15, No. 60, 9 
September 2009. For detailed legal analyses of the complaints review and remedies 
system in the Ethiopian public procurement law, see Tecle Hagos Bahta (2012), 
„Complaints Review and Remedies under the Federal Government Procurement Law in 
Ethiopia‟, 21 Public Procurement Law Review, No.5, pp.188-203. 
69
 See http://ppa.gov.et/ (Last visited on 16 August 2019). See particularly Art. 26 of the 
Standard Conditions of Contract. 
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3. The Legal Framework for Conciliation 
3.1 Rules of procedure and conduct 
Despite the flexibility and informal nature of amicable ADR methods, there are 
rules of procedure and conduct which direct the parties during the conciliation 
and mediation processes. Unlike negotiation, the conciliation processes are 
amenable to a few minimum procedural safeguards some of which should be 
imperatively observed and some others serve as the supplementary rules in 
assisting the disputing parties in reaching at a compromise. We shall, therefore, 
turn to shed light on the legal framework governing conciliation proceedings.70 
3.2 Conciliable (mediatable) disputes 
Parties are free to choose to either submit their disputes to amicable dispute 
settlement processes (i.e., negotiation or conciliation processes); or resort to 
arbitration or litigation.71 According to Cappelletti and Garth, most disputes, in 
fact, are settled informally without any recourse to lawyers, courts or other 
“third party” institutions. Cappelletti and Garth further noted that, „disputes that 
typically are brought to lawyers are often settled prior to litigation, and those 
brought to courts are settled prior to the court‟s judgment‟.72 Moreover, 
conciliated settlements of claims are particularly essential in interpersonal 
disputes such as between neighbors, family members, co-workers or trading 
partners - that is to say, between persons who find themselves in a lasting 
relation of “co-existence”.73 
On the contrary, disputes arising from or relating to certain subject matters 
are for some justifiable public policy rationale proscribed from being submitted 
to the private dispute settlement mechanisms including conciliation. The 
common understanding is that disputes arising out of rights that cannot be 
disposed of (i.e., diritti indisponibili) are not conciliable. In this regard, disputes 
the adjudication of which is exclusively vested in courts; namely, issues such as 
the existence and validity of betrothal, marriage, divorce, and adoption are left 
for the sole jurisdiction of courts. Similarly, issues on nationality, filiation, 
capacity and status of a person, and criminal matters relate to public interest 
which cannot be left to the discretion of parties. The vesting of disputes arising 
                                           
70
 See Arts. 3318-3323 of the Civil Code. 
71
 This scenario is summed up in the precept that: “The law … favors the compromise and 
settlement of disputed claims and will sustain such settlements if fairly made, because it is 
to the interests of the state that there should be an end to litigation.” as cited by Mauro 
Cappelletti and Bryan Garth, Civil Procedure, in Mauro Cappelletti (ed.) International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol. XVI, p. 21. 
72
 Id., at 69. 
73
 See also Ibid. 
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out of administrative contracts solely in courts has also used a similar 
rationale.74 
3.3 Duty of the disputing parties 
For an amicable ADR to come to fruition, the role of the negotiating parties 
cannot be over-emphasized. At least, the parties are expected to cooperate in 
appointing a conciliator; showing willingness to share information with the 
conciliator; participating in good faith; remaining focused throughout and be 
part of the solution; refunding any reasonable expenses incurred by the 
conciliator; and, paying the remuneration to the conciliator, if agreed.75 
3.4 Duty of the conciliator 
During the negotiation processes, the conciliator should make sure that he/she 
should enable the parties to state their views. As discussed earlier, the 
conciliator may also propose a settlement agreement, if circumstances permit. 
Depending on the success or failure of the conciliation process, the conciliator 
should draw up the terms of the „Compromise‟ or the „Memorandum of Non-
Conciliation‟ respectively. It is to be noted that the parties cannot bring the case 
to court until the Memorandum of Non-Conciliation is handed down by the 
conciliator.76 In practice, this is seldom complied with. The conciliator should 
also discharge his duties within six months77 as of the date of appointment 
unless otherwise agreed78 or provided by specific law.79 
3.5 Enforcement of conciliation clauses 
In order to fully amplify the legal position of conciliation clauses incorporated 
in contracts and statutes, it is important that we highlight how arbitral clauses 
inserted in the same documents are treated. An arbitral clause inserted in a 
contract cannot be unilaterally varied by a party. Until and unless the 
contracting parties choose to let it lapse by mutual agreement,80 both parties are 
duty bound to submit the issues in dispute to arbitration. Hence, in the presence 
of a valid arbitral clause, a recalcitrant party who ventures to refuse to 
participate altogether in the arbitration proceeding or part thereof risks an ex 
parte arbitral proceeding and eventually a default award. Does this position 
                                           
74
 See Art. 315(2) of the Civil Procedure Code.  
75
 Arts. 3318-3324 of the Civil Code. 
76
 Art. 3320(2) cum Art. 3321(3) of the Civil Code. 
77
 Art. 3321(1) of the Civil Code. 
78
 Ibid. 
79
 For instance, in resolving collective labour disputes, the conciliator is expected to 
discharge his/her duty within 30 days. See Art. 142(3) of Labour Proclamation 
No.377/2003, supra note 58. 
80
 Art. 3344(1) of the Civil Code. 
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equally apply to amicable ADR clauses (negotiation and/ or conciliation 
clauses) inserted in a contract?  
We can envisage two possible approaches. To begin with, for a negotiation 
or conciliation process to succeed, it entirely depends on the free will and 
cooperative spirit of the parties. If either of the disputing parties is tempted to 
slow down or utterly stonewall it, then there is no next move. The question 
therefore is: whether specific performance could be sought for contractual 
conciliation or negotiation clauses. What would be the remedy if such dispute 
settlement mechanisms are compulsorily prescribed by legislative provisions81 
in spite of which one of the parties refuses to participate?  
Fekadu Petros argues that court-annexed ADR processes are imposed upon 
the parties and that „ADR‟s legitimacy is eroded by its association with 
compulsion. It does not look or feel „safe‟ to those forced to use it‟.82 True, 
coercing or cajoling parties, short of their consensual commitment, –to be 
dragged into a process which cannot flinch by an inch save with the parties‟ full 
co-operation and interaction– is, of course, the very antithesis of amicable 
dispute settlement processes. Court-annexed conciliation processes had been in 
practice for some years in some of the federal courts. Notwithstanding the lures 
thereof, the legal bases, for so compelling the parties by the courts –to conciliate 
their disputes– seem to be missing. 
It is, however, different when the conciliation clause emanates either from 
the considered policy rationale of the legislature or has been mutually agreed 
upon by the parties that when and if disputes arise, they should settle it amicably 
via conciliation processes. In the former case, courts realize that when laws are 
clear in terms, they are there to be executed. Thus, if the laws prescribe that 
direct negotiation or conciliation, or arbitration for that matter, is the convenient 
forum for resolving particularly designated types of disputes, deference should 
be granted to the will of the legislature regardless of the judge‟s own conviction. 
In such a case, the courts will only exercise the jurisdiction over the matter 
covered under the conciliation clause if the mediator or conciliator fails to bring 
the process into fruition83 or that the time-frame (set forth contractually or 
legally) within which he/she should have brought the process into fruition has 
expired.84 
                                           
81
 See Fekadu Petros, supra note 39, p.119 (wherein it is stated that „legally imposed ADR 
does not exist in Ethiopia‟). The present writer has a different view for the reasons 
discussed above in Section 2 of this Article. 
82
 Id., pp.119-120. 
83
 This is the case scenario where the mediator or conciliator draws a memo of non-
conciliation as envisaged under Art. 3320(2) of the Civil Code. 
84
 Art. 3321 of the Civil Code. 
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This line of argument is supported by the Cassation Division in its holding, 
in Dawit Abebe v Andnet No. 4 Condominium Housing PLC and Kamil Jemal,85 
that multi-tiered dispute resolution clauses embodied either in legislation or 
contractual clauses must be complied with. The Cassation Division noted that in 
resolving disputes in cooperative societies, each step must be complied with 
prior to taking the dispute to the higher echelon in the dispute settlement 
mechanism; hence, instructing the parties to apply conciliation at first instance, 
and then arbitration prior to eventually seeking for judicial intervention. This 
position has been further reinforced by the Cassation Division in National 
Insurance Corporation of Ethiopia (NICE) v Commission for Sustainable 
Agricultural Rehabilitation86 wherein the Court stated that „dispute resolution 
clauses should be enforced by courts‟. Moreover, the fact that conciliation 
clauses, like any contractual stipulations, are laws between the parties and 
should be observed by the parties has been advanced by the ruling of the 
Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court in Boro Travil Construction 
Works PLC v Ephrem Shibru.87 
When the parties, at the time of contractual negotiations, believe that disputes 
that arise out of or relating to their specific legal relationship can best be 
resolved amicably through negotiation or conciliation, there is no doubt in their 
minds that the contractual terms will guide conducts in their contractual 
relationship including when disputes surface in the said relationship. It might 
have even been the center-piece during their pre-contractual negotiations for 
which either of the parties might have made some concessions in favor of 
winning the conciliation clause for the obvious advantages it serves in the 
commercial dispute settlement processes. Conciliation processes might have 
been considered as critical for purposes of maintaining confidentiality, for 
instance, during pre-contractual negotiations in technology transfer agreements 
(which combine know-how, trade-secret, franchising agreements, etc), or 
government procurement of hard-defense materials and other businesses such as 
banking and insurance contracts. In such cases, leaving the enforcement of the 
conciliation clause to the unfettered discretion of either party would seriously 
diminish security of transactions for those who act relying on the legal system.  
Thus, if the enforcement of the conciliation clauses in the aforementioned 
transactions is deemed proper, it should not make any difference –whatever the 
transaction may happen to be– because the parties had it negotiated and 
considered it wise to include the conciliation clause in their contractual 
relationships. Quite often, such conciliation clauses are inserted in the contract 
                                           
85
 Cassation Case No. 91745 [2006 EC], Fed. Sup. Ct. Rep., Vol. 16, p. 38. 
86
 Cassation Case No. 27349 [2000EC], Fed. Sup. Ct. Rep., Vol.7, p. 146. 
87
 Cassation Case No. 106286 [2007EC], Fed. Sup. Ct. Rep., Vol.17, p. 358. 
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in „escalation clauses‟ or the so-called multi-tiered dispute resolution clauses. 
The use thereof is intended to be a condition precedent to the commencement of 
litigation or arbitration.88 If that is so, there is no reason why the specific 
performance of the conciliation clause cannot be demanded. At any rate, a 
validly agreed contractual term is a law between the parties89 and eventually it is 
worthy of the attention of the law enforcement bodies.  
However, the parties cannot and should not be forced to reach a compromise 
agreement. Rather what is demanded of the parties here is the „duty to 
participate in good faith‟ in the conciliation proceedings. It is well noted that „… 
what is enforced is not co-operation or consent, but participation in a process 
from which co-operation and consent might come‟.90  To be more specific, it is 
emphatically stated that there is: „utility in requiring parties, who are clearly 
bent on being difficult, to submit to conciliation processes … Initial reluctance 
is not necessarily fatal to a successful mediation. If the parties enter into it as 
they all said they would, the skill of the mediator or conciliator would be given 
full play to bring about consensus.‟91 After all, it is the conciliator who is 
equipped with the necessary tactics and techniques for scanning the parties‟ 
differing positions in order to diagnose the underlying interests so that it may be 
possible to forge a remedial solution that works out for the optimal mutual gain.  
3.6 Confidentiality and immunity of conciliators from being witnesses  
During the conciliation proceedings, conciliators become inundated with flurry 
of all kinds of information insofar as the parties remain frank, open, and 
transparent. For this reason, a person who acted as a conciliator cannot and 
should not act as an advocate of either of the parties in any subsequent 
adversarial proceeding should the conciliation processes fail to come to 
fruition.92 The question, however, is whether a conciliator can be called upon as 
a witness by either party should the conciliation processes fail. There is no doubt 
                                           
88
 See also Karl Mackie et al., supra note 47, p.172.Where it is meant to be otherwise, 
however, it should be clearly stated. In this regard, the authors of FIDIC Rainbow Suite 
(1999) have clearly stated that „… both parties shall attempt to settle the dispute amicably 
before the commencement of arbitration. However, unless both parties agree otherwise, 
arbitration may be commenced […] even if no attempt at amicable settlement has been 
made‟. Peter Booen (2000), The FIDIC Contracts Guide: Conditions of Contract for 
Construction, for Plant and Design-Build, and for EPC/ Turnkey Projects, 1
st
 ed., p.314. 
89
 Art. 1731 of the Civil Code. 
90
 See Karl Mackie et al, supra note 47, p.174. 
91
 Ibid, p.182, citing the Australian Chief Justice Andrew Rogers. 
92
 See Arts. 19(1) and 20(3) of the Federal Court Advocates‟ Code of Conduct Council of 
Ministers Regulation No.57/1999, Fed. Neg. Gaz, Year 6, No.1, Sept. 1999. Same 
treatment is also envisaged under art. 19 of the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (1980), 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1980Conciliation_rules.html>  
    (Last visited on 16 August 2019).  
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that the conciliator‟s role should be privileged in order to create a degree of trust 
between the parties and the conciliator.93 Ethiopian law lacks in the necessary 
protection for the parties in this regard.  
Maintaining the confidentiality of a dispute between the parties means that 
both the existence of the dispute between the parties and what is discussed 
during the proceedings should not be disclosed in subsequent arbitral or 
litigation proceedings if the amicable conciliation process fails to attain its 
objectives. In other words, statements, admissions, offers, or evidence that may 
have been introduced or discovered during the process for the sole purpose of 
exploring and effectuating mutually agreed-upon solutions cannot and should 
not be used as evidence in subsequent litigations or arbitrations should the said 
amicable conciliation process fail.  
Without such confidentiality principle, conciliation proceedings are futile 
exercises. Indeed, it is quintessential for the success thereof, to be transparent, 
open, and focused on addressing the underlying interests of both parties; the 
parties should not be sidetracked to fret over subsequent legal consequences of 
their conduct or statements during the negotiation processes. The question, 
therefore, is whether the Ethiopian legal system accords protection against the 
disclosure of matters of confidentiality in the conciliation proceedings lest 
unwary parties who in good faith strive for the success of these conciliation 
proceedings (these proceedings being socially, economically and politically 
desirable) should be trapped. It is unfortunate that the answer is emphatic „no‟. 
Thus, in practice, it has been left to the discretion of the court to either grant or 
deny a party leave to introduce evidence pieced up together during the 
conciliation proceedings.  
The follow-up question is: whether the Ethiopian legal system permits parties 
to enter into an agreement to the effect that the negotiation processes or 
evidentiary documents introduced in the process remain confidential. Would the 
Ethiopian courts give deference to such reciprocal promises? The Ethiopian 
Arbitration and Conciliation Center (EACC) had designed a model 
confidentiality agreement for the conciliation processes which had to be 
administered under the EACC‟s Institutional Mediation Rules. Whilst it may be 
hoped that the courts should accord it some degree of deference to such 
reciprocal promises, there is no guarantee yet under the legal system.  
                                           
93
 In this regard, the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (1980) stipulate, under Art.19, that the 
parties are duty-bound to provide the conciliator immunity from being called upon as a 
witness in subsequent arbitral or judicial proceedings.  
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Short of supporting legal provisions, the parties are left to devise a 
confidentiality agreement. Under such agreement, the parties vow to respect 
their reciprocal promises in the hope that the courts as well will enforce them. 94 
In the absence of guarantee for confidentially, the disputing parties participate in 
the conciliation processes fully conscious that each party should strategize its 
communications in a way that does not permit any inference of admissions, 
offers, or statements that may potentially be adduced in subsequent arbitral or 
litigation proceedings. The latter is, to say the least, inhibitive of communication 
flow. 
And finally, from the conciliator‟s perspective, Article 3323 of the Civil 
Code is anachronistic which does not cater for the modern professional 
conciliator. The provision does not entitle the conciliator to remuneration; it 
only makes a provision (under Sub-Article 1) for a refund of „any reasonable 
expenses he has incurred in the discharge of his duties‟. Conciliators should, 
thus, be on guard to clearly and expressly make stipulations in their agreements 
on the amount of remuneration and modality of payment. 
4.  Enforcing the Outcome (Compromise, Negotiated Settlement 
or Compromise Agreement) of ADR Methods 
It is noteworthy that if a negotiated settlement is reached as a result of direct 
negotiation, mediation or conciliation, then that agreement is easier to enforce 
than an arbitrator‟s award because it would have been concluded through the 
parties‟ own choice.95 Moreover, the disputing parties‟ consensual and amicably 
agreed-upon terms of settlement are solidified into a special contract, legally 
termed as „compromise‟.96 In a nutshell, an agreement reached between the 
disputing parties through the negotiation, mediation or conciliation processes 
will constitute „negotiated settlement‟ or compromise‟.97 
                                           
94
  Art. 24(1) of the Draft Evidence Rules of 5 April 1967 ( 27 Megabit 1959 E.C), provides:  
     “In civil cases, no admission is relevant, if it is made either upon an express condition 
that evidence of it is not to be given, or under circumstances from which the court can 
infer that the parties agreed together that evidence of it should not be given”.  
        Arguably this is the possible scenario (that is to say, the without prejudice clauses in a 
conciliation agreement or, in the absence thereof, the nature of conciliation proceedings 
per se respectively) that the draftsman must have had contemplated in the aforesaid Draft 
Rule.  
95
 See also Nael Bunni, supra note 2, p.445. 
96
 Art. 3307 of the Civil Code. 
97
 The English term „compromise‟ as used in the Civil Code is equivalent to the term 
„transaction‟ in French and „transactio‟ in Latin languages. In other words, compromise is 
only used herein to refer to the French notion of transaction, not the French notion of 
compromis. The latter refers to an agreement to submit existing disputes to arbitration 
(i.e., submission agreement). Incidentally, it should also be mentioned that the term 
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Due to inconsistent court practices in Ethiopia,98 the legal status of the 
outcomes of these amicable dispute settlement mechanisms has been marred by 
uncertainties. The problem has been compounded as „compromise‟, as a legal 
concept, rarely attracted the attention of scholars99 in Ethiopia. Regardless of the 
relatively unregulated nature of negotiation and conciliation, the outcome 
thereof (that is to say, compromise) has received due legislative treatment in the 
Civil Code.100 In cases of conciliation, the negotiated settlement can only be 
binding upon the conciliating parties when the terms of the compromise are 
written and confirmed by it being signed by the parties.101 
                                                                                                            
clause compromissoire refers to an agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration (i.e., 
arbitral clause). For more on this, see Sally Brown Richardson (2008-2009), „Civil Law 
Compromise, Common Law Accord and Satisfaction: Can the Two Doctrines Coexist in 
Louisiana?‟, 69 La. L. Review, 175-217, 180-81 (wherein it is stated that, in civil law 
jurisdictions, such as France, Louisiana, and Quebec, „transaction‟ is generally defined as 
a contract by which the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, terminate an existing 
dispute or prevent a future one.) 
98
 The Appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court, for instance, held the following in a 
well-known case: 
    „Furthermore, Art. 3312(1) of the Civil Code is a mandatory provision which stipulates 
that compromise, as between the contracting parties, has the effect of res judicata without 
appeal‟. [Translation by author]. The Appellate Division erroneously relied on Art. 
3312(2) of the Civil Code  to disallow appeal against an arbitral award rendered following 
an arbitration agreement which contained „finality clause‟. For more on this, see 
Dragados J & P Avaz SA JV v Saba Construction PLC, EACC (Arbitral Awards) Rep., 
Vol. 3, p.82. See also Mukemil Mohammed  v Miftah Kedir, supra note 1, p.182 (wherein 
the Court briefly addressed the difference between a compromise and an arbitration 
award). 
99
 A notable work on compromise is by Demissew Tessema (2000), Compromise as a 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism under the Ethiopian Civil Procedure Code, Senior Thesis, 
Addis Ababa University (Unpublished).  It should be mentioned here that while credit 
should be given to the writer for the illuminating work on the subject, the said writer 
unduly considers the concept of „compromise‟ as a dispute settlement mechanism rather 
than a product of a dispute settlement mechanism. See also Robert Allen Sedler (1968), 
Ethiopian Civil Procedure, HSI University, Addis Ababa, pp.186-190. For a 
comprehensive analysis on the distinction between ADR and Arbitration, see also Fekadu 
Petros (2009), supra note 39. 
100
 See Arts. 3307-3317 of the Civil Code of Ethiopia and Arts.274-276 of the Civil 
Procedure Code of Ethiopia. 
101
 There is no such requirement for compromise contracts which are the outcome of the 
negotiation processes. The formality requirement for the compromise contract reached 
through negotiation is as enunciated under Art. 3308(2) of the Civil Code. In this regard, 
it is worthwhile to note that Art. 3308(2) is firstly predicated on the assumption that 
rights should be classified into non-disposable rights (i.e., diritti indisponibili) and 
disposable rights. The latter can further be categorized into those rights disposable only 
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This written and signed document is a contract document102 wherein the 
parties‟ mutual interests and gains are embedded. Needless to say, it also 
contains the contractual rights and duties which were bargained for and upon 
which agreement has been reached either through direct negotiation processes or 
the third-party-neutral-led conciliation processes. For a compromise reached 
through direct negotiations, the format required for constituting a valid 
compromise, as enunciated under Art. 3308 of the Civil Code, is the format 
required by law for creating, modifying, and/ or extinguishing legal obligations 
[or rights] without consideration.  
A multitude of legal rights and obligations are created, modified or become 
extinct „without consideration‟ (ex titulo lucrativo) orally short of it being 
necessary to follow a certain format. It is, thus, legally possible for negotiating 
parties to have a valid compromise orally. However, it is hoped that prudent 
parties would think twice lest they should be ensnared in another round of 
disputes for the avoidance of which the parties would have had already spent 
time, cost and energy. In other words, post-settlement relationships between the 
parties may turn to be marred by uncertainties owing to the parties‟ failure to 
fully and precisely capture what was agreed upon. Equally true is the fact that 
oral agreements are difficult for purposes of enforcement by a court of law 
should a party remain recalcitrant to perform his/her part of the bargain under 
the compromise agreement. This is particularly true where compromise 
agreements are reached prior to the commencement of a court proceeding or for 
disputes in respect of which no suit has been instituted. 
 However, if the compromise is reached at the hearing, it should be „reduced 
to writing and signed by the parties‟.103 For compromises which are concluded 
subsequent to the commencement of a court proceeding, i.e., at the hearing or 
out of court, it is evident that Arts. 276-277 of the Civil Procedure Code shall 
apply. Art. 277 stipulates that a compromise agreement should be reduced to 
writing and signed by the parties. The foregoing position of the law should, 
however, mean to apply only for compromises reached through direct 
negotiations. It should be noted that terms of a compromise agreement reached 
through mediation or conciliation cannot be binding upon the parties unless, 
pursuant to Art. 3322(2) of Civil Code, the parties have „expressly undertaken in 
writing to confirm them‟.104 
                                                                                                            
for consideration (disposition ex titulo oneroso) and those that are freely disposable 
(disposition ex titulo lucrativo).  
102
 Art. 3307 of the Civil Code. 
103
 Art. 277(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. 
104
 Art. 3322(2) of Civil Code states: „The parties shall not be bound by the terms of the 
compromise drawn up by the conciliator unless they have expressly undertaken in 
writing to confirm them‟. 
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Art. 3307 of the Civil Code defines „compromise‟ as “a contract whereby the 
parties, through mutual concessions, terminate an existing dispute or prevent a 
dispute arising in the future.” Art. 274(1) of the Civil Procedure Code also 
offers for the functional definition of a compromise. It states that “[t]he parties 
may by a compromise agreement relating to all or some of the matters in issue 
terminate a dispute with respect to which a suit has been instituted.” 
From the reading of these provisions, the requirements for a valid 
compromise in Ethiopia are:105 (i) the existence or the possibility of a dispute 
between two or more parties, (ii) intention of ending (terminating) existing 
disputes or preventing future disputes, (iii) mutual or reciprocal concessions 
made by the disputing parties, and (iv) a contract between the parties. 
Nonetheless, this contract is not like an ordinary contract in that it is statutorily 
bestowed with the force of res judicata without appeal.106 To this effect, either 
party may invoke the preliminary objection as enunciated under Art. 244(2)(b) 
cum 244(2)(g) of the Civil Procedure Code to deny the other party of the re-
litigation of the issues that have been definitively dealt with under the 
negotiation or conciliation processes. This procedural right should be coupled 
with Art. 3312(1) of the Civil Code.107  
In this regard, the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has made 
it clear, in Birru Qorcho v Kifle Habdeta.108 that compromise once reached 
consensually by the parties is bestowed with finality. Similarly, the Cassation 
Division invoked Art. 3312 of the Civil Code and the issue of res judicata, and 
decided on finality of compromises in Kedir Haji Hussen and Others v Amin 
Osman and Others.109 The Cassation Division thus reiterated its position on the 
fact that compromise agreements are not amenable to appeal and that such 
                                           
105
 For more on these requirements, see Sally Brown Richardson, supra note 97, 175-217, 
180-81. 
106
 Art. 3312 of the Civil Code. 
107
Art. 3312(1) of the Civil Code states that „[a]s between the parties, the compromise shall 
have the force of res judicata without appeal’. The res judicata effect of compromise has 
also been established in the common law countries through case laws. In England, for 
instance, Lord Romilly M.R stated in Plumley v Horrell (1869) 20 L.T 473, that: 
     “Prima facie everybody would suppose that a compromise means that the question is not 
to be tried over again. That is the first meaning of compromise. When I compromise a 
law suit with my adversary, I mean that the question is not to be tried over again”. 
Similarly, Bowen L.J in Knowles v Roberts (1888) 38 Ch. D 263 at 273, also noted thus: 
“As soon as you have ended a dispute by a compromise you have disposed of it.” See 
David Foskett (1996), The Law and Practice of Compromise, 4
th
 ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 
p.90. 
108
 Cassation Case No. 25912 [2000EC] Fed. Sup. Ct. Rep., vol.5, p.343. 
109
 Cassation Case No. 52752 [2002EC] Fed. Sup. Ct. Rep., vol.9, p.355. 
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agreements render res judicata of all issues in relation to the disputes covered 
thereunder.  
However, in Ananaytu Issa v Asina Hussen,110 the Cassation Division held 
that a compromise reached by disputing parties with intent to vary a court‟s 
judgment should be registered in the court. It is submitted that this holding is 
erroneous as it imposes extra burden upon the parties which is not envisaged in 
the law. The peculiar facts obtained in the foregoing case, which necessitated 
guarding the post-judgment settlement against deceitful practices by registering 
it in the court, might have informed the decision of the Court. Nevertheless, this 
will undoubtedly give rise to far-reaching negative repercussions to the sanctity 
of compromise settlements. 
A compromise Agreement which is the outcome of a conciliation process 
that is initiated and reached, be it prior or post commencement of a court 
proceeding, is accorded with the legal recognition that courts at any level are 
duty-bound to respect and enforce. Parties would more often than not be 
forthcoming to discharge their side of the bargain. This is because in a truly 
consensual conciliation process, the parties fully control the outcome of the 
process, i.e., the compromise. In case one of the parties refuses to execute the 
compromise agreement, however, the court will not entertain any claim or 
action in relation to the issues upon which the compromise is reached. Nor is a 
party entitled to institute an appeal against the compromise agreement. This is 
because of its res judicata effect without appeal.  
Thus, subsequent to the signing of a compromise agreement by the parties, 
courts would only intervene to enforce the operative parts of the compromise 
agreement against the breaching party. Nonetheless, in order for a compromise 
to enjoy the legal status accorded thereto under the Ethiopian legal system, the 
courts should be able to exercise minimum judicial oversight to see to it that it is 
not tainted with irregularities that render it void or invalid in the eyes of the law.  
Given that compromise is a contract, the general requirements set out for the 
validity of contracts under the general principles of contract in the Civil Code 
apply mutatis mutandis.111 Moreover, compromise should (as a special contract) 
meet specific criteria which determine the validity of a compromise. Thus, a 
party to a compromise may wish to challenge the validity of a compromise on 
the following grounds:112  
- that the negotiations (be it through direct negotiation or conciliation) took 
place on the basis of void or falsified document unless the parties, at the time 
                                           
110
 Cassation Case No. 98263 [2007EC] Fed. Sup. Ct. Rep., vol.17, p.336. 
111
 Arts.1675-2026 of Civil Code. 
112
 See Arts. 3313-3316 of the Civil Code. 
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of the contract, had in view the possibility that the document might be void or 
false;113  
-  there existed a judgment having the force of res judicata without appeal which 
had already settled all the issues contained in the compromise and which 
either or both were not aware of;114  
-  there was willful withholding of a document by either party;115  
- the „compromise‟ settles issues arising out of a contract whose objects 
(obligations) or causes116 (purposes in view to the extent denoted in the 
document) are contrary to the law or to public morality, and, the terms of the 
compromise are contrary to the law or morals.117 
It should be noted that compromise is chargeable with stamp duty.  In the 
case of failure to do so, the compromise cannot be admitted in evidence; nor 
would it be noted upon or authenticated by any person or public office.118 
Conclusion 
A lot remains to be desired in the use of modern amicable dispute settlement 
processes in the commercial dispute settlement in Ethiopia. Whenever parties 
are willing to resort to such processes, it is not infrequent for the courts to fail 
them in the proper application and interpretation thereof. It has always been the 
desire of legislatures to draw the attention of the disputing parties towards the 
possibility of using these processes in the settlement of various disputes. This 
can be learnt from the Civil Codal provisions which point out to the parties of 
the need to resort to these processes in a bid to resolving their disputes 
amicably.  
                                           
113
 Id., Art. 3313. 
114
 Id., Art. 3314. 
115
 Id, Art. 3315(2). 
116
 Id., Art. 3316 cum Arts.1716-1718; note that unlike the simplified form of the doctrine of 
causa (referred to as „motive‟ in the Civil Code) in private law contracting, special 
contracts –administrative contracts or public law contracting– conceive the original two-
pronged effect that it possesses under the French legal system: illicit cause and absence 
of cause. See Arts. 3170-71 of the Civil Code. For more on cause (causa), see Tecle 
Hagos Bahta (2017), „Conflicting Legal Regimes Vying for Application: The Old 
Administrative Contracts Law or the Modern Public Procurement Law for Ethiopia?‟, 4 
APPLJ 1, available at http://applj.journals.ac.za [visited on 16 August 2019]. 
117
 Art. 277(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. 
118
 A cumulative reading of Art. 2(1), Art. 6(8), Art. 10 and Section 3 of the Schedule of the 
Proclamation to Provide for the Payment of Stamp Duty No.110/1998. The amount 
payable for which both the conciliating parties assume the joint and several liabilities is 
1% ad valorum for determinable amount and Birr 35 for undeterminable amount. 
30                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 13, No.1                             September 2019 
 
 
The Civil Code embodies relatively modern rules on „compromise‟ which, if 
properly understood and applied, can be the bloodline for the proper 
enforcement of settlement agreements reached through amicable dispute 
settlement processes. This does not, however, mean that the ADR methods are 
adequately regulated. On the contrary, these processes lack in the basic legal 
infrastructure for the proper implementation thereof. Matters of confidentiality, 
enforcement of ADR clauses, conciliator‟s immunity, etc… are the uncharted 
territories in the Ethiopian legal system. 
It is envisaged that parties to an ad hoc conciliation process would resort to 
the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules of 1980119 in conjunction or in lieu of the 
directory or permissive conciliation rules of the Civil Code and Civil Procedure 
Code (Arts. 274-77) subject, of course, to the imperative rules thereof. Needless 
to say, institutional conciliation proceedings would be guided by the respective 
institution‟s conciliation rules.120 Any party (federal or state) with the mandate 
of initiation of conciliation law(s) in Ethiopia should also no doubt consider the 
provisions on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Conciliation (2002).121 It is, therefore, high time that issues of paramount 
importance in amicable ADR mechanisms are addressed through legislative 
interventions.                                                                                                         ■                                                                                                         
 
                                           
119
 The UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (1980) are adopted by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on 23 July 1980 and approved by 
a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of 4 December 1980 being 
„[c]onvinced that the establishment of conciliation rules that are acceptable with different 
legal, social and economic systems would significantly contribute to the development of 
harmonious international economic relations…‟. 
120
 See, for instance, the Conciliation/Mediation Rules of 2007 of the Arbitration Institute 
(AI) of the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association (AACCSA) at 
<http://www.addischamber.com/file/ARBITRATION/20131126/MediationAndConcilati
onRule%20%28Engllish%20Version%29.pdf> (Last visited on 16 August 2019). See 
also the Rules of Arbitration and Mediation of 2005 of the now defunct Ethiopian 
Arbitration and Conciliation Center (EACC). (On file with the author). 
121
 Supra note 92 (Last visited on 16 August 2019). 
